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Introduction by Greg Gibson
and Elizabeth Fisher
Just over twelve months ago, PLoS
Genetics published a paper [1] demonstrat-
ing that, given genome-wide genotype
data from an individual, it is, in principle,
possible to ascertain whether that individ-
ual is a member of a larger group defined
solely by aggregate genotype frequencies,
such as a forensic sample or a cohort of
participants in a genome-wide association
study (GWAS). As a consequence, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
Wellcome Trust agreed to shut down
public access not just to individual geno-
type data but even to aggregate genotype
frequency data from each study published
using their funding. Reactions to this
decision span the full breadth of opinion,
from ‘‘too little, too late—the public trust
has been breached’’ to ‘‘a heavy-handed
bureaucratic response to a practically
minimal risk that will unnecessarily inhibit
scientific research.’’ Scientific concerns
have also been raised over the conditions
under which individual identity can truly
be accurately determined from GWAS
data. These concerns are addressed in two
papers published in this month’s issue of
PLoS Genetics [2,3]. We received several
submissions on this topic and decided to
assemble these viewpoints as a contribu-
tion to the debate and ask readers to
contribute their thoughts through the
PLoS online commentary features.
Five viewpoints are included. The
Public Population Project in Genomics
(P
3G) is calling for a universal researcher
ID with an access permit mechanism for
bona fide researchers. The contribution by
Catherine Heeney, Naomi Hawkins, Jan-
tina de Vries, Paula Boddington, and Jane
Kaye of the University of Oxford Ethox
Centre outlines some of the concerns over
possible misuse of individual identification
in conjunction with medical and family
history data, and points out that if
geneticists mishandle public trust, it will
backfire on their ability to conduct further
research. George Church posits that
actions directed toward restricting data
access are likely to exclude researchers
who might provide the most novel insights
into the data and instead makes the
argument that full disclosure and consent
to the release of genomic information
should be sought from study participants,
rather than making difficult-to-guarantee
promises of anonymity. Martin Bobrow
weighs the risks and benefits and proposes
four steps that represent a middle ground:
Retain restricted access for now, make
malicious de-identification practices ille-
gal, increase public awareness of the issues,
and encourage recognition that scientists
have a special professional relationship of
trust with study participants. Finally,
Bruce Weir provides a commentary on
the contribution of the two research
articles from Braun et al. [2] and Visscher
and Hill [3].
P
3G’s Viewpoint: Future-
Proofing Population Genomics?
The privacy concerns raised in the
recent paper by Homer et al. [1] have
had a significant impact on international
open-access genomic databases. Individual
single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) da-
ta from a participant in a GWAS can
reveal whether that participant is in a
DNA mixture including up to 1,000
participants. Although in hindsight it is
clear that basic statistical theory would
predict this to be the case, the reality is
that it had previously gone completely
unrecognised.
This situation illustrates the need to
raise the level of discussion, thereby
avoiding the ad hoc resolution of immedi-
ate privacy concerns and anticipating
future scientific possibilities with a view
to providing prospective guidance.
The implications of the Homer paper
were discussed by the international Public
Population Project in Genomics (P
3G)
(http://www.p3g.org). The consensus was
that any scientist seeking to work with
genomic data be required to adhere to an
internationally agreed code of conduct
and to provide proof of institutional status
as a bona fide researcher.
A successful applicant could be awarded
a permit and placed on a registry of users
that would allow defined access to geno-
mic databases (e.g., individually identifi-
able password and/or other criteria). This
would avoid the need for repeated appli-
cations to prove bona fide status to
different bodies, as is currently required.
Infringement of the terms of the permit
would bar the applicant from further
access to genomic databases adhering to
this code of conduct.
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should be adopted that are broadly
consistent with the principles of the
proposed permit mechanism. Specifically:
(1) determination of a researcher’s bona
fides may be internet based, but it must
involve formal proof of institutional status;
(2) each permit must be linked to an
identified registered individual, using a
universal ‘‘researcher ID’’ system such as
the one already promoted by the GEN2-
PHEN project (http://www.gen2phen.
org); and (3) large-scale secondary data
providers should be expected to adhere to
the same standards and practices as
primary data providers when releasing
data to a researcher holding a permit.
For this to work, it would require
international recognition of the necessity
and feasibility of such a strategy, as
happened with the Bermuda Principles
[4]. Such a proactive framework would
contribute to sustaining ongoing public
trust and participation in beneficial geno-
mic research.
George Church’s Viewpoint:
Considering a Creative
Commons Universal Waiver
There is a clear movement to give all
taxpayers access to government-funded
research data [5]. We could debate
amazingly sophisticated ways of encrypt-
ing public gene+trait data and even more
amazing methods to thwart such encryp-
tion. However, we should acknowledge
that the biggest security gaps are often
social in nature. Getting researchers and
their administrators to sign a legal form
doesn’t even begin to guarantee compli-
ance. For example, high-security defense
data access requires psychosocial security
checks of relatives, past colleagues, and
personality tests (far beyond NIH require-
ments). Nevertheless, authorized individu-
als occasionally take classified data outside
of secure environments. Human gene+trait
data seem destined to be amazingly useful, to
be in huge demand, and to be capable of
study from a vast number of angles. It is hard
to guess who will make the biggest out-of-
the-box analytical breakthroughs, but it is
likely that these insights will come from
highly integrative approaches, in which
individuals are evaluated in cohorts holisti-
cally, just as a physician would—not as one
disembodied organ plus one key SNP. It is
likely that many of these insights will come
from people outsideof theclinical specialty of
the original study (e.g., computer scientists
and systems biologists). The more people
granted access to these datasets, the more
likely it is that someone will decide that it is
ethically imperative (or cost-effective, or
expedient) to share the data with researchers
outside of the secure vault (or with the study
participants/patients). The alternative model
([6], http://www.personalgenomes.org/) is
to consent in advance with the understand-
ing of full disclosure (not legalese weasel-
words about ‘‘trying hard’’ to maintain
anonymity). Furthermore, to help ensure
informed consent rather than merely obtain-
ing legal signatures on long consent forms,
one can require 100% scores on tests of
comprehension of the contents of the consent
form and related materials. This has the side
benefit of educating participants before the
start of the study rather than after some
potentially alarming result needs to be
communicated back to them. Finally, the
standard IRB (institutional review board)
practice respects the autonomy of the
individual research participant, hence does
not require the consent of other family
members. In the increasingly (re)identifiable
datasets, increasing levels of family buy-in
will likely be desirable, for example, in
constructing pedigrees containing trait data.
Fortunately there are many altruists who
participate in medical research. However,
one well-publicized incident of data leakage
with inadequately informed consent could
cause a backlash comparable to what
happened with gene therapy in 1999 or
Vioxx (rofecoxib) in 2004. In contrast, if we
don’t overpromise on anonymity and if
these participants and their families are
deeply engaged (not merely treated as de-
identified animals) and they see direct value
from these studies, then they might tell
their stories widely and it may become
increasingly easy to recruit more partici-
pants. The ability to make personal cell
lines (http://www.personalgenomes.org/)
and gene+trait data available under the
new Creative Commons universal waiver,
CC0 (http://creativecommons.org/weblog/
entry/13304), could greatly enable unprec-
edented levels of commercial and academic
creativity and collaborations.
Catherine Heeney, Naomi
Hawkins, Jantina de Vries, Paula
Boddington, and Jane Kaye’s
Viewpoint: The Changing
Context of Data Sharing—Types
of Identifiabilityin Genomic Data
In 2003, a consortium of scientists
working largely in public institutions
triumphed over Celera in the race to
map the human genome [7]. A willingness
to make their data freely available on the
Web played a part in this achievement.
Subsequently, this approach to data shar-
ing has become a norm in genomic
research [8] and often a requirement of
funding [9]. However, genomic informa-
tion is not restricted to the research
community. There are now private com-
panies (for example, 23andMe) collecting
sequence data and related information
[10]. The real problem for genomic
research is not that the information is
available within the scientific research
community, but that genomic sequence
information is accessible to people outside
of this community, who are not subject to
the same safeguards, oversight, and pro-
fessional codes of conduct. This has
significant implications for our ability to
protect the privacy of research partici-
pants.
Risks to privacy can arise because of the
very nature of genomic sequence data
[1,11], but also because information can
be inferred from other available data [12].
The ability to combine datasets exacer-
bates the problem [13]. For example,
Gitschier demonstrates that by the itera-
tive comparison of surnames in genealog-
ical registries and data on Y chromosomes
from the HapMap project, held in the
CEU dataset, genetic information about
named individuals could be inferred with
considerable accuracy [13]. Moreover,
Nyholt and colleagues show the difficulty
of concealing sensitive genomic data by
using linkage disequilibrium and data on
other polymorphisms to infer information,
which had not been directly released,
about James Watson’s ApoE gene [14].
Genomic data, combined with other
information sources freely available on the
Web, enables inferences about individuals,
family members, or population groups that
can undermine privacy. Inference is a
reasonable stand-in for direct information
and can even be used to support decisions
about individuals, as it regularly is in the
fields of insurance and credit [15]. The
Internet supports access to everything,
from Facebook to individual birth records,
while ever-evolving data processing tech-
nologies enable efficient data collection
and comparison of available datasets [16].
Raising these issues may appear alarmist;
however, as Greenbaum et al. recently
suggested, promising anonymity may al-
ready be a thing of the past due to the
potential to infer information and the
nature, amount, and variety of data freely
available [17].
Requirements for the ethical manage-
ment of research data have sought to
balance the privacy of data subjects with
the benefits of research, utilising anonymi-
sation and informed consent [18]. How-
ever, it is now unrealistic to promise
participants in research projects absolute
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[19]. The rise in the sheer number of
available data sources, in both the com-
mercial and public sectors [20], coupled
with the ease with which an individual’s
DNA can be (and is) analysed, suggests
that the context for data release has
changed. Disregarding this takes for grant-
ed the support of participants and the
wider public for genomic research in a
way that could have damaging conse-
quences for future scientific endeavours.
Martin Bobrow’s Viewpoint:
Toward a Middle Ground
Genuinely new ethical questions are
rare, but difficult forms of old questions
are exercising genomics researchers. Al-
though posed as questions arising from
GWAS or large cohort studies, the issues
actually derive mainly from funders’
pressure to encourage wide sharing of
basic research data and from the power of
the Internet as a tool for data sharing. If
researchers simply kept their data to
themselves, there would be no problem.
Making data available to many intelli-
gent minds maximises the likelihood that
the benefits of research will rapidly be
returned to society, but also maximizes
opportunity for breaching the duty of
privacy to research participants. One
way people attempted to reconcile these
objectives was to make only aggregated
genotype data publicly accessible on the
Internet, with restricted access to data
giving individual participants’ genotypes.
The landmark paper of Homer et al.
shows, as is in retrospect intuitively
obvious, that this doesn’t work. The
presence of an individual’s DNA can be
detected even if it is a very minor
component of a mixture, and it is therefore
possible that, under very special circum-
stances, an outsider could deduce that a
named individual was part of, for example,
a group of patients with a specific
disease—the anonymised data could be
re-identified.
To react to this surprising turn of events
by abandoning large-scale genomic stud-
ies, or reducing the pressure for data
sharing, would, in my view, be a dispro-
portionate response to the level of threat as
we currently see it. A widely discussed
option is to get very explicit consent from
patients. I would take it for granted that
researchers must be open and honest with
volunteer participants, but long, detailed
technical consent documents tend to
obfuscate, rather than illuminate, and
may be better at shifting the legal burden
than actually informing research partici-
pants. As such, they do little to engender
the essential ‘‘trusting relationship’’ that
should exist between the research com-
munity, research participants, and the
public.
How, then, should we react to this new
state of affairs?
1. Major research databases have already
moved aggregated genomic data from
open Internet access to restricted sites
where researchers can gain access in
return for undertakings on appropriate
data use. Provided these mechanisms
do not become overly onerous and that
they can be given sufficient teeth to
ensure that the obligations are en-
forced, this will not be a major obstacle
to utilization of the data and could be
retained indefinitely.
2. I wish it were clearer as to whether
deliberately misusing data to re-estab-
lish the identity of anonymised individ-
uals is a legally punishable offense. It
breaches fundamental principles of
data protection, but clear statements
of penalties and the intention to
e n f o r c et h e s ew o u l db ee x t r e m e l y
helpful. The law in any one country
would not, of course, stop a malign
individual in a distant jurisdiction, but
it would seriously inhibit the use of his
or her efforts by state agencies, police,
insurers, and others in the data sub-
ject’s own country, and without that
there is little risk of harm.
3. The risk of harm to a research
participant often comes not so much
from their participation in the research,
but from other activities, such as
hospital data keeping, private sector
genome studies, etc., which allow some
genomic data associated with identify-
ing characteristics of the individual to
become accessible to the malign data
miner. Without that, the ‘‘Homer’’
phenomenon has limited power to
harm. Widespread public discussion
to alert people and regulatory agencies
to the dangers of having named
genomic data lying in potentially
accessible places is needed.
4. We all have confidential relationships
with many people—lawyers, bankers,
doctors—whom we trust because they
are bound by professional codes of
conduct with enforceable penalties.
Research scientists, and particularly
the institutions that employ them,
probably need to make their own
position in this regard more explicit—
there should be clear codes of conduct
and penalties for breaching them.
Further knee-jerk reactions should be
avoided. More research will clarify exactly
how sensitive these methods for re-identi-
fying individuals are, particularly in rela-
tion to the choice of appropriate reference
populations. I would hope the next 12
months would produce greater clarity and
time to develop a proportionate long-term
response.
Bruce Weir’s Viewpoint:
Individual Genotyping in
Forensics and GWAS Contexts
Braun et al. [2] and Visscher and Hill
[3] have given helpful analyses of the
question discussed by Homer et al. [1]:
does an individual with a known genotype
belong to a sample of individuals for which
only allele frequencies are known? The
analyses of all these authors suppose that
allele frequencies are known also for a
reference sample, and the question could
be rephrased as: is this proband a member
of this test sample of individuals, or of this
reference sample, or neither sample?
Homer et al. phrased their discussion in
a forensic context where there is often
interest in knowing whether or not a
particular person was a contributor to a
mixed sample of DNA from more than
one person. They made brief mention of
GWAS for which allele frequencies, but
not individual genotypes, are made pub-
licly available and where there may be
interest in knowing whether or not a
particular person was a member of a
study. The resulting attention to this
second situation, and the restriction of
access to GWAS allele frequencies by the
NIH and the Wellcome Trust, is likely the
reason why Braun et al., as well as
Visscher and Hill, concentrated on this
situation and made only brief mention
of forensic applications. Braun et al.
employed both simulated and real data
to show that the original analysis of
Homer et al. is susceptible to linkage dis-
equilibrium among the markers, the dif-
ferences in allele frequencies between test
and reference samples, and the relative
sizes of these two samples. They also
looked at the effects of the proband having
a relative in either sample. Their work
showed high specificity for the test statistic
of Homer et al., but with the possibility of
low sensitivity.
Although forensic science is not their
main focus, Visscher and Hill introduce
their treatment with likelihood ratios, as
do forensic scientists in assessing how data
support competing hypotheses. In this
case, the two hypotheses are that the
proband is either a member of the test
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ratio of the probabilities of the proband
genotype under these two hypotheses is
easy to formulate. If indeed the proband is
in the test sample, Visscher and Hill show
that the log-likelihood ratio has an expect-
ed value of ½N   =(NzN   ) (m=2N),
where m is the number of SNPs that are
scored. The test sample has allele frequen-
cies based on N individuals, and the
reference sample has N* members. This
value is multiplied by 21 if the proband is
not a member of the test sample, and a test
statistic can be constructed as the squared
difference of the logarithms of the two
probabilities divided by an estimate of the
variance of the difference. In a very pretty
result, Visscher and Hill show that this test
statistic has an approximate expected
value of m=2N. Good discrimination
between the two hypotheses requires a
large number of SNPs and/or a small test
sample. Homer et al. also remarked on the
advantage of using a large number of
SNPs. The Visscher and Hill result
assumes the SNPs are all independent,
and they showed how linkage disequilib-
rium among the markers decreases the test
statistic.
The relationship of a proband to a
GWAS could be addressed by taking the
cases as the test sample and the controls as
the reference sample. Depending on
whether the proband was a case, or a
control, or neither, the log-likelihood
ratios would be positive, negative or
negative. Formal statistical tests follow
from the work given by Visscher and Hill.
Numerical work of all the authors con-
firms the wisdom of restricting access to
GWAS case-control allele frequencies.
With the increasing sensitivity of forensic
DNA profiling, often resulting from low
template amplification [21], an increasing
number of forensic samples contain DNA
from multiple contributors, and the inter-
pretation of such samples has progressed
significantly since 1995, when lawyers could
argue in US courts against the use of
likelihood ratios for mixed samples [22].
Two features of multiple-contributor forensic
profiles suggest the theory of Visscher and
Hill will need further development for that
context. In the first place, the very sensitivity
of forensic genotyping means that allelic
dropout is common [23], and fairly sophis-
ticated methods [21] are needed to calculate
likelihood ratios. Secondly, it will be some
time before forensic scientists abandon the
use of 13–20 microsatellite markers in favor
of the very large numbers of SNPs consid-
ered by Braun et al. and by Visscher and
Hill, largely because of the investment in
very large offender databases. In June 2009,
there were over seven million profiles in the
US databases (http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
codis/clickmap.htm). Current forensic anal-
yses start by determining whether or not all
the proband alleles are seen within the
mixture profile (maybe taking into account
drop-out) and then calculating a likelihood
ratio. Uncertainty over the number of
contributors in the mixture (the test sample)
will make allele frequency determination
d i f f i c u l tf o rt h et e s ts a m p l e .
Conclusion by Greg Gibson and
Elizabeth Fisher
Something we can all agree on is that
there is enormous goodwill in the general
public toward medical research and a
strong desire on the part of most people to
be willing participants. At the same time,
there is genuine fear of scientific abuse in
general and gene technology in particular,
and great potential for irreparable harm to
both research and predictive health im-
plementation, if identifiability issues are
not addressed sensitively. As editors of a
journal committed to open access to
research, we are naturally suspicious of
policies that restrict data access but we also
understand that freedom usually comes at
a price. What is essential is to get the
balance of privacy protection and open,
honest, and uniform consent right, and we
hope that this short article encourages
greater participation in the debate and
education surrounding the issues.
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